

Dariusz Kozerański

**Polish-American Military Co-operation in Peace Support Operations  
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–1999)**

The economic crisis of the end of the 1970's, which consumed Western Europe, worsened Yugoslavia's economic situation. The problems in deliveries of food caused street demonstrations and strikes, as well as an intensification in emigration at the beginning of the 1980's. The problems worsened in repayments of foreign debt, high inflation, unemployment, as well as difficulties in the socio-political situation of the country. With the death of Tito in 1980, the state lost the man whose power had been the most important element integrating the country. When he began to lose power, the local party took over and began assembling men of the same nationality. During this time, the federal line of policy had less and less influence over the state. It is important to note that national rebirth played an important role in the process of the break-up of Yugoslavia – mainly in Serbia (for which the events in Kosovo in 1981 were important). Nationalist feelings significantly increased after Slobodan Milosevic assumed leadership in 1987. He wanted to give Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy as well as to dominate the whole federation. The fall of communist regimes in Central Europe and the weakness of the Soviet Union in 1989 accelerated the development of incidents in Yugoslavia significantly. The threat of invasion by Warsaw Pact armies had disappeared and this was one of the more important integrating factors. The indivisibility of communist power was questioned by the appearance of various national political movements. This doubtless had a weakening effect on the country's unity. The appearance of separatist movements in that period in Central Europe shows clearly that the endeavours of small nations to obtain independence could end successfully.

The changes in the constitution of Yugoslavia on 28 March, 1989, by which Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomy, had a powerful effect on other republics, especially Slovenia and Croatia. On 23 December, 1990, a referendum took place in Slovenia in which 88% of the population voted for independence.<sup>1</sup> In turn, on 26 December the president of Slovenia, Milan Kucan, declared independence. Similar confederation demands were made by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Macedonia. However, federal and Serbian powers rejected these proposals.

In March 1991 Slobodan Milosevic announced officially that Serbia would not have to pay federal taxes. At the end of March, the leaders of the self-appointed Serbian republic of Krajina announced the secession of this province, and they began to define the borders of their state. In turn, Serbs living in eastern Slovenia also began secession preparations. Soon after this, Croatian workers were expelled from the national park in Plitvice by Serbian Police, and it was announced that the park would be annexed to Krajina. Members of the Croatian police were sent to the site. On 1 April, Serbs from Krajina announced its annexation to Serbia. Clashes began at this time, and fortifications began in Krajina and Slovenia.

On 19 May, a referendum took place in Croatia, in which 95% voted in favour of the creation of an independent and sovereign state. The president of Croatia, Franjo

---

<sup>1</sup> M. Kuczyński, M. Ray-Ciemiega, *Balkański syndrom 1991–1999*, Warszawa 2000, p. 31.

Tudjman, appointed the national armed forces (the National Guard), and he began preparations for defence. On 25 March, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia announced independence simultaneously. In response, the federal forces began a military operation with the aim of gaining control over the rebellious republics, which would later be recognised as the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which lasted to the end of 1995.

From the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia the United Nations (UN) was involved in the process of finding a peace solution. On 23 November, 1991, the UN General Secretary met in Geneva with the presidents of Serbia and Croatia as well as the secretary of the Yugoslavia Defence State. An agreement was reached which resulted in an immediate ceasefire (the fourteenth in the course of the war and the first under patronage of the UN), the unblocking of the barracks in Croatia, and the withdrawing from the republic of the Yugoslavian military forces.

Each side of the conflict expressed the desire for an immediate peace operation, which they confirmed by approving of the UN peace plan.<sup>2</sup> This provided the basis for the UN Court to pass the Resolution No. 743 on 21 February, 1992, in which United Nations Protection Forces in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) were created, initially for a period of twelve months.<sup>3</sup> The peace forces were composed of about 13 thousand soldiers, 530 police officers, and 500 civil workers. The military and civil staff came from 37 different countries, the majority of which were permanent UN workers.

An important event for the region's future was the acknowledgement of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence on 6 April, 1992, by the European Community and Canada, and a day later by the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Poland was one of twelve countries that sent an operational battalion to aid in the realisation of tasks within the framework of the peace operation – UNPROFOR – in the former Yugoslavia (on the basis of UN Court resolution No. 749). An infantry battalion was created on 27 March, 1992, as the result of the Polish Army General Staff Chief's instructions and an order from Silesian District Commander No. Pf 22 on 16 March, 1992.<sup>5</sup> The unit consisted of 888 persons,<sup>6</sup> later increasing to 1,020 soldiers.<sup>7</sup> It was created on the basis of Silesian District units, and training was conducted in the Military Preparation Centre for UN Peace Operations located in Kielce (commanding personnel) and in Opole (soldiers). The battalion for the first rotation travelled in several railway transports to Slunj.<sup>8</sup> On 15 April, 1992, the preparations of the Polish military camps were begun. At the end of April, the Polish battalion began to execute

---

<sup>2</sup> W.E. Gilman, D.E. Herold, *Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security*, NATO Defence College, Rome 1994, p. 21; *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2002, p. 92.

<sup>3</sup> Cz. Kącki, *Sily wielonarodowe do misji pokojowych*, Warszawa 2003, p. 152.

<sup>4</sup> C. Off, *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle. A Story of Generals and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda*, Toronto 2001, p. 136; J. Markowski, *Polacy w operacjach pokojowych. Operacje pokojowe ONZ*, Warszawa 1994, p. 134.

<sup>5</sup> Archiwum Instytucji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej (AIMON), 1224.96.2, Rozkaz dowódcy Jednostki Wojskowej nr 1135 nr 1 z 27.03.1992 r., c. 1.

<sup>6</sup> AIMON, 1224.96.4, Etat nr 02/136 Batalionu Piechoty [UNPROFOR], 12.03.1992.

<sup>7</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.1, Wykaz poprawek w etacie nr 02/136 dla batalionu piechoty UNPROFOR, [1992–1994], c. 2.

<sup>8</sup> AIMON, 1224.96.2, Rozkaz Organizacyjny Dowódcy Polskiego Batalionu Piechoty Sił Ochronnych ONZ na przegrupowanie do Jugosławii nr 2, 10.04.1992, c. 19–37.

the peace tasks (observation in appointed areas of responsibility, patrolling, controlling the movement of vehicles and people, and escorting the convoys with humanitarian aid).<sup>9</sup>

The Polish battalion cooperated in peace operations with different countries on the terrain of the former Yugoslavia, and personnel was enlarged to 1,298 soldiers and civil workers at the beginning of 1995.<sup>10</sup> However, due to the limited forces and weak armament of the UNPROFOR, ineffective UN and Western European Union peace policies, as well as a renewal of war activity, the Polish battalion and various peace units were unable to convince the local military and civil population of the warnings of the peace agreements. The causes of this situation were, first of all, the lack of heavy armament (connected with the mandate of the operation) and, secondly, a delayed and insufficient reaction from the international community to changes in the Balkans.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, the conditions in which Polish soldiers had to execute tasks were particularly difficult. An example of the soldiers' helplessness is the murder of several thousand Bosnian Moslems in Srebrenica (July 1995) in the presence of UNPROFOR soldiers from the Dutch battalion.<sup>12</sup>

The prolonging of war activity and in particular the multiethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina led NATO to support UN peace efforts.<sup>13</sup> The peace activities were connected with supervising and protecting the embargo warnings on weapons deliveries put on all the republics of the new Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council. In October 1992, NATO planes (with the AWACS system) began monitoring the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 and 11 April, 1994, following an order from the commanding staff of UNPROFOR, there were air strikes with the aim of protecting Gorazde (the city was declared a safe zone by the UN Security Council). The first air-attack by NATO forces in Bosnia was on 5 August, 1994, when Bosnian Serbs took weapons from a protected store-house in the vicinity of Sarajevo. The bombing of Pale, the Bosnian Serb capital (25 May, 1995), was one of the most spectacular actions carried out by NATO air forces.

However, the actions undertaken by NATO air forces did not bring about the desired effects. The Serbian units in Bosnia were the targets of air raids. They made attempts to take hostages.<sup>14</sup> On 3 June, 1995, the decision was made in Paris about the creation in Bosnia of the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF), which was intended to increase UNPROFOR safety and to help the besieged enclaves in eastern Bosnia. However, the United States affirmed that US forces could support NATO air and logistic operations within the framework of UN peace operations. With regard to the lack of effects of UN and European Union political interventions, the White House took over the initiative.

---

<sup>9</sup> AIMON, 1224.96.2, Rozkaz Dowódcy Polskiego Batalionu Piechoty Sił Ochrony ONZ nr 8 z dn. 29.04.1992 r., c. 53.

<sup>10</sup> AIMON, 1224.95.7, Etat nr 02/136/0 Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Ochronnych ONZ (UNPROFOR) w byłej Jugosławii, 31.01.1995 r., c. 3–4; ibidem, Wykaz poprawek w etacie nr 02/136/0 dla Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Ochronnych ONZ (UNPROFOR) w byłej Jugosławii, [7.02–12.12.1995 r.], k. 2.

<sup>11</sup> J. Gow, *European Security and the Yugoslav Wars* [in:] J. Poole, R. Guthrie, *Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the E-environment*, London 1993, pp. 210–211.

<sup>12</sup> *Udział jednostek Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973–2003. Wybrane problemy*, D.S. Kozerański (ed.), Warszawa 2004, p. 93.

<sup>13</sup> R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Warszawa 1999, p. 146.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, p. 148.

The United States worked together with NATO air forces to lead an almost 20-day air-operation (28 August–17 September 1995), which led to a settlement between the opposing sides of the local fighting forces.

The effective mediation of the US secretary of state, Richard Holbrooke, had a significant influence on negotiating a peace agreement. There was an initial meeting of the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Croatia, Franjo Tudman, and the president of Serbia, Slobodan Miloszevic, on 21 November, 1995, in Dayton (American air-base). A peace arrangement was signed on 14 December, 1995, in Paris. The IFOR – Implementation Forces – were created, comprising 60 thousand soldiers,<sup>15</sup> with the aim of replacing the UN peace forces (UNPROFOR) on 20 December, 1995, and supporting NATO Rapid Reaction Forces. The organised peace forces under NATO leadership were the result of changes in international and NATO policy which was connected with the providing of mutual support.<sup>16</sup>

Apart from NATO members, IFOR was made up of countries co-operating within the framework of the programme “Partnership for Peace,” as well as Russian units acting on autonomic principles. Generally, in peace support operations the representatives of 32 countries took part.<sup>17</sup> The logistic protection was organised in Taszar and Kaposvar, located on Hungarian territory (at former Russian military bases).

After creating the international IFOR, on 16 December, 1995, NATO published Operational Plan No. 10405 (SACEUR OPLAN 10405) to execute the multinational operation “Joint Endeavour.”<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the United States agreed to arm and train the army of the Croatian-Moslem Federation, in order to create a counterweight for Serbian military power in this region.<sup>19</sup>

---


<sup>15</sup> R.B. Oakley, M.J. Dziedzic, E.M. Goldeberg, *Policing the New World Disorder. Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington 1998, p. 275.

<sup>16</sup> *Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i wojskowe*, A. Ciupiński, K. Malak (ed.), Warsaw 2004, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> Cz. Kącki, op.cit., p. 155.

<sup>18</sup> *Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny*, J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński (ed.), Warszawa 2001, p. 118.

<sup>19</sup> D. Kozerański, *Konflikty zbrojne na Bałkanach i próby ich rozwiązania pod koniec XX wieku*, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, nr 4, Warszawa 2003, p. 376.



Source: Newsletter No. 97-1 "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) from Operation Joint Endeavor," Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1997

#### **Outline 1.** Structure of Multinational Division "North" in IFOR

The American Multinational Division "North" was composed of the following brigades: Nordic-Polish, Russian, Turkish and two American brigades.

On 6 December, 1995, Poland was invited to take part in the IFOR operation officially. A day earlier, the Polish government undertook Resolution No. 141/95 in the matter of the creation of the Polish military contingent in the Implementation Forces in Bosnia (IFOR).<sup>20</sup> On this basis, the Ministry of Defence provided the necessary documents in order to form and prepare the battalion to execute tasks in the Balkans.<sup>21</sup>

The IFOR battalion was the first Polish unit to take part in a NATO peace operation.<sup>22</sup> Earlier, from 1973 the Polish military contingents had executed mainly logistic tasks, or had operated (from 1992) in UN peace missions.

The Polish battalion was mainly formed on the basis of the 16<sup>th</sup> Air-attack Battalion of the 6<sup>th</sup> Air-attack Brigade from Kraków.<sup>23</sup> This unit together with battalions from


<sup>20</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.18, Uchwała nr 141/95 Rady Ministrów z dn. 5.12.1995 r. w sprawie polskiego kontyngentu wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 186–189.

<sup>21</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z 13.12.1995 r. w sprawie sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 177–181; AIMON, 1675.00.1, Decyzja Sekretarza Stanu w MON z 15.12.1995 r. w sprawie określenia zadań dla jednostek organizacyjnych w związku z przygotowaniem i udziałem polskiego kontyngentu wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 168–170.

<sup>22</sup> D. Kozerański, *Skład i zadania polskich kontyngentów operacyjnych w misjach pokojowych ONZ (1992-1995)*, Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej im. T. Kościuszki „Poglądy i doświadczenia”, nr 3, Wrocław 2002, p. 105.

Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway composed the Nordic-Polish Brigade (NORD-POL BDe), which was in charge of northern Bosnia. The contingents were part of the American Multinational Division “North” (MND), the staff of which was located in Tuzla.

The Polish unit calculated about 650 soldiers of the 16<sup>th</sup> Air-attack Battalion.<sup>24</sup> The battalion was composed as follows: command and staff of the battalion, supply and command company, three assault companies (located in: Banja Vrućica on the Serbian side, in Jelah on the Moslem side and Jurisicia near Žepče on the Croatian side), and a support company.<sup>25</sup>



Source: AIMON, 1675.00.18, Uchwała nr 141/95 Rady Ministrów z dn. 5.12.1995 r. w sprawie polskiego kontyngentu wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 186–189; AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej z 13.12.1995 r. w sprawie sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), c. 177–181; AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja Nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej w sprawie sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), 13.12.1995 r., c. 177–180; AIMON, 1675.00.1, Zarządzenie szefa Sztabu Generalnego WP nr 136/Sztab z 15.12.1995 r. w sprawie przygotowania 16 bpd do składu Sił Implementacyjnych (IFOR) w ramach operacji NATO w Bośni i Hercegowinie i funkcjonowania batalionu w rejonie misji, c. 171–176.

<sup>23</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.1, Zarządzenie szefa Sztabu Generalnego WP nr 136/Sztab z 15.12.1995 r. w sprawie przygotowania 16 bpd do składu Sił Implementacyjnych (IFOR) w ramach operacji NATO w Bośni i Hercegowinie i funkcjonowania batalionu w rejonie misji, c. 171–176.

<sup>24</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.18, Decyzja Nr 195/MON Ministra Obrony Narodowej w sprawie sformowania i działania Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Implementacyjnych w Bośni (IFOR), 13.12.1995 r., c. 177–181.


<sup>25</sup> M. Kubiński, *Użycie jednostek desantowo-szturmowych w operacjach pokojowych* [in:] *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe. Planowanie, zadania, warunki i sposoby realizacji*, D.S. Kozerawski (ed.), Warszawa 2003, p. 71; F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w doktrynie obronnej RP*, Toruń 1999, p. 164–165; P. Piątkowski, *Operacja IFOR „Wspólny Wysilek” w Bośni i Hercegowinie*, Warszawa 1996, p. 12.

## **Outline 2. Structure of the Polish Battalion in IFOR (1996)**

The main tasks of the Polish Battalion in IFOR were: supervising the zone of separation, patrolling the area of responsibility, assurance of freedom of movement for peace forces, maintenance on the main roads at permanent check-points, control of local military forces and humanitarian activity.<sup>26</sup>

The Polish-American co-operation in IFOR unrolled within the framework of peace tasks already underway. The Poles received battle support from the American division, and near the Polish battalion functioned a permanent team of fire support (FIST). Moreover, combined Polish-American patrols were organised as well as related activities with representatives of local military units.<sup>27</sup>

On the basis of UN Safety Court Resolution No. 1088 of 12 December, 1996, the Stabilisation Forces (SFOR) were created. They comprised about 35 thousand soldiers.<sup>28</sup> The termination of SFOR began on 20 December, 1996. Although the terminating operation was planned to take only 18 months, it has been prolonged and is still taking place today. Poland decided to also participate in the SFOR operating battalion force.<sup>29</sup> The contingent's personnel underwent changes: there were 435 soldiers and civil workers in 1998, increasing to 492 persons in the second half of 1999.<sup>30</sup> The battalion force was reduced to two assault companies, and the support company was also withdrawn from Bosnia.



<sup>26</sup> D. Kozerański, *The Participation of Polish Military Units in Peace Operations in 1992–1999*, “Sbornik VVŠ”, PV, nr 1, Vyškov 2004, p. 131; *Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt...*, p. 118–119.

<sup>27</sup> In Polish area of responsibility were located: Serbian, Croatian and Muslims local military units.

<sup>28</sup> R. Zięba, op.cit., p. 149.

<sup>29</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.1, Uchwała nr 146/96 Rady Ministrów z dnia 17.12.1996 r. w sprawie utworzenia Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Stabilizacyjnych w Bośni (SFOR), c. 165–167.

<sup>30</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.16, Protokół zadania i objęcia stanowiska służbowego dowódcy PKW – SFOR, 5.07.1998 r.,

c. 2; AIMON, 1675.00.23, Etat nr 29/174/0 PJW w Siłach Wielonarodowych w Republice Bośni i Hercegowiny – SFOR, 6.03.1999 r., c. 6.

Source: AIMON, 1675.00.1, Uchwała nr 146/96 Rady Ministrów z dnia 17.12.1996 r. w sprawie utworzenia Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Siłach Stabilizacyjnych w Bośni (SFOR), c. 165–167; AIMON, 1675.00.23, Etat nr 29/174/0, Polska Jednostka Wojskowa w siłach Wielonarodowych w republice Bośni i Hercegowiny – SFOR, 6.03.1999 r., c. 5–6.

### **Outline 3. Structure of the Polish Battalion in SFOR (1997–1999)**

The basic tasks of the Polish battalion in SFOR were:<sup>31</sup> controlling all sides of the conflict by inspecting local forces' weapons and equipment, monitoring local military activity, maintaining liaison contacts with both sides of the conflict, co-operating with the CIMIC, patrolling designated areas, providing on order Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) in the platoon level, and supervising, monitoring and clearing mine fields.

During the SFOR operation within the framework of peace tasks, Polish-American co-operation developed. Similarly, during the IFOR operation, in the Polish SFOR battalion, the American fire support team closely co-operated with Polish soldiers. The co-operation took place on a wider scale and involved contact with the civil population in the Polish zone of responsibility. Joint social patrols were organised, reaching many settlements with the aim of giving humanitarian aid (often to refugees and emigrants).

Joint training was organised by the CMIC and included psychological activity,<sup>32</sup> with the aim of building among the local population a positive image of peace forces. Joint informative workshops were organised at schools (with the aim of passing on to children and youth accessories or interesting press distributed by SFOR and international organisations).

The Polish and American soldiers, supported by the other battalions of the NORD-POL Brigade, led many operations, a good example of which is "Harvest." This operation was connected with taking weapons and ammunition away from the local population and various centres, with the aim of making the Bosnian region safer.

In 1998, international parachuting jumps were organised in Tuzla in which commanders and soldiers took part from Polish, American and Russian units.

The realisation of peace tasks within the framework of the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period 1996–1999 was very meaningful for the development of Polish-American military co-operation, and permitted the following:

- the breaking of mutual barriers and the building of confidence;
- the improvement of the level of mandatory task realisation;
- the training of commands, staffs and units with common aims and activity procedures;
- the exchange of operating information in areas of responsibility;
- mutual battle support (from the American side – artillery, helicopters and aviation) and logistic support during peace task realisation;
- linguistic improvement.

---

<sup>31</sup> F. Gągor, K. Paszkowski, op.cit., p. 166; S. Bieniek, W. Wójtowicz, *SFOR – pewność pokoju i stabilizacji w Bośni*, Warszawa 1998, p. 12.

<sup>32</sup> More about CIMIC activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: T. Dukiewicz, D. Kozerański, *The Main Role, Aims and Tasks of Civil Co-operation in UN and NATO Operations*, „Sbornik VVŠ”, PV, nr 1, Vyškov 2004, p. 113–122; A. Jóźwiak, Cz. Marcinkowski, *Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych*, Warszawa 2002; W. Wójtowicz, *Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacji pokojowej w Bośni*, Warszawa 1998.



At the beginning of January 2000, the Nordic-Polish Brigade was displaced – its tasks were taken over by the smaller Nordic-Polish Battle Group.<sup>33</sup> In the new SFOR operation, about 300 Polish military and civilian personnel have been conducting peace tasks. A significant part of the peace forces was sent to other regions of the world and Europe (for instance to Kosovo and Afghanistan).

The Polish units' participation in international peace operations organised by the UN changed the character of the executed tasks significantly. Earlier experiences had been primarily connected to logistic tasks. Polish soldiers' attendance in peace operations had an effect on their preparations and equipment. The political-military situation in areas of peace missions created additional difficulties and threats.

The attendance of Polish contingents in peace operations in the Balkans, mostly under NATO command, served as practical skill-assessment tests alongside other NATO members within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" programme. Moreover, this situation offered Poland a chance to prove its rightful membership in NATO.

## References

### Primary Sources:

- Bieniek, S., Wójtowicz, W., *SFOR – pewność pokoju i stabilizacji w Bośni*, Warszawa 1998.
- Gągor, F., Paszkowski, K., *Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe w doktrynie obronnej RP*, Toruń 1999.
- Gilman, W.E., Herold, D.E., *Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security*, NATO Defence College, Rome 1994.
- Kuczyński, M., Ray-Ciemiega, M., *Balkański syndrom 1991–1999*, Warszawa 2000.
- Piątkowski, P., *Operacja IFOR „Wspólny Wysilek” w Bośni i Hercegowinie*, Warszawa 1996.
- Poole, J., Guthrie, R., *Peacekeeping, Arms Control and the Environment*, London 1993.

### Secondary Sources:

- Bezpieczeństwo polityczne i wojskowe*, A. Ciupiński, K. Malak (ed.), Warszawa 2004.
- Dukiewicz, T., Kozerański, D., *The Main Role, Aims and Tasks of Civil Co-operation in UN and NATO Operations*, Sbornik VVŠ, PV, nr 1, Vyškov 2004, pp. 113–122.
- Jóźwiak, A., Marcinkowski, Cz., *Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych*, Warszawa 2002.
- Kącki, C., *Siły wielonarodowe do misji pokojowych*, Warszawa 2003.
- Kozerański, D., *Skład i zadania polskich kontyngentów operacyjnych w misjach pokojowych ONZ (1992–1995)*, Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej im. T. Kościuszki „Poglądy i doświadczenia”, nr 3, Wrocław 2002, pp. 103–109.
- Kozerański, D., *Konflikty zbrojne na Bałkanach i próby ich rozwiązania pod koniec XX wieku*, Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Obrony Narodowej, nr 4, Warszawa 2003, pp. 365–380.

---

<sup>33</sup> AIMON, 1675.00.18, Rozkaz szefa Sztabu Generalnego WP nr 3/Org. Z 5.01.200 r. w sprawie rozformowania PJW w Siłach Wielonarodowych w Republice Bośni i Hercegowiny oraz sformowania PKW w Siłach Stabilizacyjnych w BiH, c. 1–3.

- Kozerawski, D., *The Participation of Polish Military Units in Peace Operations in 1992–1999*, Sbornik VVŠ, PV, nr 1, Vyškov 2004, pp. 123–135.
- Off, C., *The Lion, the Fox and the Eagle. A Story of Generals and Justice in Yugoslavia and Rwanda*, Toronto 2001.
- Markowski, J., *Polacy w operacjach pokojowych. Operacje pokojowe ONZ*, Warszawa 1994.
- Międzynarodowe operacje pokojowe. Planowanie, zadania, warunki i sposoby realizacji, D.S. Kozerawski (ed.), Warszawa 2003.
- Newsletter No. 97-1 “Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) from Operation Joint Endeavor”, Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Fort Leavenworth, Ks, 1997.
- Oakley, R.B., Dziedzic, M.J., Goldeberg, E.M., *Policing the New World Disorder. Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington 1998.
- Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warszawa 2002.
- Udział jednostek Wojska Polskiego w międzynarodowych operacjach pokojowych w latach 1973–2003. Wybrane problemy*, D.S. Kozerawski (ed.), Warszawa 2004.
- Umiędzynarodowiony konflikt wewnętrzny*, J. Pawłowski, A. Ciupiński (ed.), Warszawa 2001.
- Wójtowicz, W., *Współpraca cywilno-wojskowa w operacji pokojowej w Bośni*, Warszawa 1998.
- Zięba, R., *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego*, Warszawa 1999.